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ABSTRACT
The importance of input has been a widely recognized concept in the field of second language 
acquisition. Much research has been conducted to examine how input is processed, the various 
facilitative attributes of input, and the effectiveness of pedagogies that directly manipulate input. 
Among these domains of input-related research, it is critical to first understand the very nature of 
input-processing. Hence, in this paper, four different models of input-processing are examined and 
compared side-by-side. The discussion aims to disambiguate discrepancies in terminologies, 
identify common emphases on gap-noticing and cognitive-comparison, and suggests the need for 
further research on the role of attention/consciousness in input-processing.   
INTRODUCTION
Input is one of the most important elements in the process of second language acquisition (SLA). 
As Gass (1997) points out, second language (L2) learning simply cannot take place without input 
of some sort. This statement has been generally supported by researchers in the field regardless of 
one’s theoretical approach. Building upon this understanding, specific issues have been actively 
debated, such as: (1) how input is processed during SLA and how it is incorporated into a learner’s 
developing interlanguage (IL) systems (Carroll, 1999, 2000; Chaudron, 1985; Gass, 1997; 
Krashen, 1982; Sharwood Smith, 1986, 1993; VanPatten, 1996, 2002); (2) the amount of input that 
is necessary to enable acquisition (Ellis, 2002; Krashen, 1982; White, 1989); (3) the various 
attributes of input and how they may facilitate or hinder acquisition (e.g., frequency, saliency, and 
transparency); and (4) instructional methods that may enhance input to promote acquisition (e.g., 
various types of input enhancement, recasts, and processing instruction). The above four domains 
of inquiry have led to a plethora of studies. However, before one can logically approach the issues 
related to application, as in the latter three debates, there must first be an overall understanding of 
how input is in fact incorporated into the interlanguage grammar, as highlighted in the first issue. 
Decades of discussion on input processing have produced useful insights but also diverging 
terminologies and models. It is pertinent to understand them holistically in order to further the 
discussion in a more organized and efficient manner. Hence, in this paper, I will first seek to 
clarify the definitions of key terms. Next, I will explore four input processing models, proposed by 
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Chaudron (1985), Sharwood Smith (1986), Gass (1997), and Carroll (1999, 2000), extrapolate 
their commonalities and discrepancies, and identify key issues that demand further investigation.
CURRENT CONSENSUS ON INPUT
Corder (1967) made a significant observation in his seminal paper about how input is 
perceived in the process of L2 acquisition. His insight later became one of the cornerstones in 
input-related research. He discussed the notion of intake:
The simple fact of presenting a certain linguistic form to a learner in the classroom 
does not necessarily qualify it for the status of input, for the reason that input is 
“what goes in” not what is available for going in, and we may reasonably suppose 
that it is the learner who controls this input, or more properly his intake. (p. 165)
The fact that not all the available data in the learner’s environment can be absorbed and used in 
building the learner’s IL grammar presents one conundrum, and the condition that would enable 
the conversion of input into intake has been a central point of research. Corder’s comment also 
shifted the way SLA researchers perceived input: from a strictly external phenomenon to the 
interface between the external stimuli and learners’ internal systems. Discussions on learners’ 
developmental readiness, teachability, and other cognitive factors thus came to the fore (e.g., 
Doughty, 2001; Pienemann, 1989). The common consensus in the field of SLA is that what input 
learners are actually able to use for developmental purposes will depend on their current state of 
knowledge. Following this acknowledgement, however, it remains unclear exactly what 
mechanisms and subprocesses are responsible for the input-to-intake conversion. The models 
described below will provide some insights into this question.
Another basic understanding for SLA researchers is that, as input is converted into intake, 
learners make use of this material for dual purposes, namely, comprehension and acquisition. 
Drawing this distinction is important for both theory-making and empirical investigations (Faerch 
& Kasper, 1980; Krashen, 1982; Sharwood Smith, 1986; Swain, 1985; VanPatten, 1996). Learners 
have the natural inclination to decode linguistic input for meaning to achieve successful 
communication. But the type of intake derived from processing-for-meaning is not equivalent or 
sufficient to that which is needed for acquisition, which entails the creation of new or revised 
mental structures. Swain’s (1985) study of a French immersion program revealed that, based on 
communicative and comprehensible input alone, learners may achieve native-like proficiency in 
their comprehension. But their proficiency and accuracy in production lags behind that of native-
speakers despite years of exposure. Swain’s study provides support that comprehensible input does 
not necessarily lead to acquisition. At the same time, it is also true that, without comprehensible 
input, learners would not be able to make the necessary form-meaning connection for acquisition 
to occur; the reasons for this will become apparent in the discussion of the models below (Krashen, 
1982, 1985; VanPatten & Cadierno, 1993). This distinction between processing for comprehension 
and acquisition is another concept that is commonly accepted in the field of SLA research. The 
models below focus on how input is processed differently for comprehension and acquisition, and 
they lay out additional processes that need to occur beyond comprehension to trigger acquisition. 
The two dichotomies just discussed (i.e., input/intake and comprehension/acquisition) serve 
as a starting point for the models reviewed below. Beyond the general consensus, the views on 
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input processing and L2 acquisition begin to diverge. The discussion will now turn to the models 
themselves to highlight their commonalities and differences.
MODELS AND DISCUSSION
Responding to Corder’s (1967) insight and recognizing that the use of the term input has 
often been inconsistent in the field of SLA, Chaudron (1985) attempted to disambiguate and 
reconceptualize input processing. Chaudron’s model is presented first because it provides a 
stepwise framework that is paralleled by many of the later models. By a close examination of this 
model, further questions can be generated and clarification sought in the other models. The four 
models, proposed by Chaudron (1985), Sharwood Smith (1986), Gass (1997), and Carroll (1999, 
2000), respectively, are chosen because they all subscribe to a modular, nativist view on 
acquisition, in which linguistic processing is considered unique from other types of learning, and is 
served by a linguistic-specific processor. This is different from the connectionist approach, in 
which input is basically regarded as tokens for cue-weights and frequency-counting, and from 
which the statistically-based constructions arise (Ellis, 2002). The connectionist frameworks 
deserve a separate review all their own and thus will not be included here. 
Returning to the discussion of Chaudron’s (1985) model, essentially, it consists of three 
intake stages. They are: (1) the preliminary intake (i.e., the perception of input), (2) the subsequent 
stage of recoding and encoding of the semantic information into long-term memory, and (3) final 
intake (i.e., where learners fully integrate and incorporate the linguistic information in the input 
into their developing grammars). Two separate bodies of research were incorporated to capture 
these sub-processes. For the preliminary and subsequent intake stages, Chaudron drew on a first 
language (L1) information processing model put forth by Massaro (1975). According to the 
general view on information processing, a neural-based and bottom-up signal processing takes 
place initially, where auditory feature detectors receive speech (or visual) signals as neural 
impulses and analyze them according to constraints evolved in the detectors. The analyzed input is 
then stored in short-term storage, where linguistic rules and other knowledge systems are called 
upon from long-term memory to interpret this filtered signal and to synthesize it into phoneme and 
word-strings. Then, as the surface structures fade in short-term memory, a more abstract 
representation of the speech, through rehearsal and recoding, is retained in long-term memory. 
During this input-comprehending phase, processing operates both in a bottom-up and top-down 
fashion, that is, there is a continuous interaction and exchange of information taking place in 
working memory, between the feature-analysis and predictions made based on acquired rule 
systems. This sequence completes the comprehension aspect of input processing.
After comprehension takes place in the first two intake stages, learners may proceed to the 
third stage where their IL grammar is restructured and developed. Chaudron subscribed to Faerch 
and Kasper’s (1980) and Krashen’s (1982) complementary views. By having comprehended the 
input using both their current L2 competence and extra-linguistic knowledge, learners may notice 
the gap between their current IL grammar (i.e., i) and the i + 1 presented in the input, which would 
become the material that triggers their next step of development (Krashen, 1982, 1985). It is not 
clear in this model exactly how certain aspects of linguistic structures are noticed and selected and 
how new rules emerge, but learners’ readiness and a natural order hypothesis have been suggested 
for a partial answer (Pienemann, 1989). Then, once the gap has been noticed, the learner’s innate 
language acquisition device (LAD) subsequently uses these new materials to formulate IL rules 
and perform hypotheses-testing. After the rule has been initially formulated, learners’ output 
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production and the feedback they receive would then serve as a platform to test, confirm, or revise 
the rules. With sufficient testing, reformulation, and confirmation, the new rule is then 
incorporated into learners’ IL grammar.
With the three-stage conceptualization, Chaudron’s (1985) model provides an overview of 
input-processing and a point of departure for further discussion. Several components in the model 
demand further explanation. For one, interestingly, Chaudron evoked the notions of automatic and 
controlled processing to describe the quality of processing during the preliminary and secondary 
stages (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1984). By definition, controlled processing is malleable and open to 
explicit training (DeKeyser, 2001). The implication then is that, other than the hardwired and 
neural-based mechanisms, initial processing may be open to a learner’s conscious manipulation, 
which then can be made automatic through repetition. This implication begs the question of 
whether learners would be able to consciously retrieve phonemic information from long term 
memory to interpret incoming signals. If that is the case, this point would bear substantial 
theoretical as well as instructional significance. However, other models of input processing do not 
seem to support this, as will become more apparent in the later discussions. Or at least, 
Chauldron’s model needs to provide further specification to this point. Another point of ambiguity 
that is more crucial and problematic is the notion of gap-noticing. It is presented in this model as 
the central processing that needs to take place before a structure can be acquired. But it is not clear 
exactly when and where this operation takes place. Is it an encapsulated sub-process that takes 
place in the innate LAD? Does introspection or awareness of this gap-noticing play any role in 
facilitating acquisition? These questions have been left open in Chaudron’s model of input 
processing. Seeking clarification for these questions from a complementary view, I now turn to 
Sharwood Smith’s (1986) model. 
In his model, Sharwood Smith (1986) focused and elaborated on the acquisitional aspect of 
input processing, which is closer to Chaudron’s (1985) notion of final intake, and bypassed the 
initial signal processing component in his explanation. He agreed with Chaudron’s view of 
hypothesis-testing, which he termed the making of mental comparisons, and he asserted that this 
mental comparison indeed operates within the LAD. His five-stage acquisitional procedure starts 
out with learners making comparisons between their semantic representations (derived purely from 
current linguistic competence) and the total meaning representations (derived from competence 
and extra-linguistic and world knowledge). In the second stage, learners adjust their semantic 
representations as they compare the two sets of representations. Third, learners generate a surface 
structure from the adjusted semantic representation, using rules in their current grammar. Fourth, 
learners compare the original surface structure with the new surface structure and note any 
discrepancy. Finally, learners restructure their current competence system so that the adjusted 
semantic representation may be derived from the surface structures encountered in the future. 
During this five-stage operation, Universal Grammar (UG) and learners’ L1 knowledge may also 
come into play and mediate the entire process.
Similar to Chaudron’s (1985) model, Sharwood Smith (1986) emphasized the derivation of 
meaning before acquisition. Without first comprehending the messages, learners would not be able 
to proceed with the first step of comparing semantic representations (stage 1). In this sense, 
Sharwood Smith, like Krashen (1982), generally promoted the use of rich and complex input 
instead of simplified input. This is so that learners can utilize the additional extra-linguistic cues, 
available in the linguistic environment, to derive semantic representations when their current 
linguistic competence cannot support a full understanding. However, comprehensible input alone is 
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not sufficient, and acquisition may still break down for a number of reasons, which will be 
explicated below.
According to this model of input processing, there exist several junctures where processing 
for acquisition may break down. First, if there is not a noticeable gap between the two semantic 
representations (i.e., no glitches in comprehension), even if differences may indeed exist, learners 
would not attend to it. Underlying this phenomenon are the issues of depth of analysis (i.e., 
whether learners stop short at comprehension or continue to deeper analysis and actually process 
the form) and attention (i.e., whether learners would attend to the gap, with conscious awareness or 
not; Schmidt, 1990; Schmidt & Frota, 1986; Tomlin & Villa, 1994). The second possible 
breakdown in acquisition is that there is also the danger of learners conjuring an incorrect overall 
representation based on extra-linguistic information, which then would lead to inaccurate mapping. 
This is one place where repeated exposure becomes critical for fine-tuning the representations and 
hypotheses. Finally, even if learners are aware of the discrepancy between the two semantic 
representations in stages 1 and 2, there is no guarantee that they would proceed to the third stage, 
where a new surface structure is generated to better fit the adjusted representation. In fact, this 
suggests an irony in the model. If the current competence is insufficient to generate a correct 
semantic representation in the first stage (which implies the presence of incorrect rules or the 
complete absence of rules), how are learners able to generate a new surface structure from their 
incomplete competence for further comparison (stages 3 and 4)? What mechanisms, if not learners’ 
competence, would induce this generation of new structures? This last logical problem was not 
addressed directly by Sharwood Smith (1986) in his model and remains a conundrum. However, 
the issues related to noticeable-gap, depth of analysis, and attention are further addressed in Gass’s 
(1997) model, to which I will now turn.
Gass’s (1997) framework of SLA includes a similar sequence as Chaudron’s (1985) and 
Sharwood Smith’s (1986) models with stages of apperceived input, comprehended input, intake, 
integration, and output. Gass made a finer distinction between apperceived input, comprehended 
input, and intake, in which the first stage of apperceived input, in Gass’s conception, is not a bias-
free processing. A certain level of recognition and selection has already taken place as a result of 
attention, in the similar sense as Tomlin and Villa’s (1994) notion of orientation. Paralleling 
Chaudron’s and Sharwood Smith’s models but going beyond, Gass particularly stressed the 
importance of negotiated interaction during input processing and acquisition. Failure in 
communicative interaction pushes learners to negotiate for meaning. Through the act of 
clarification and elaboration for comprehension, learners then receive additional and usable input, 
and their attention may be drawn to specific problematic features in the L2. Consequently, 
interaction increases the chance for learners to make mental comparisons between their IL and the 
L2, in the same sense as proposed by Sharwood Smith. Through negotiated interaction, the input is 
enhanced in three ways. First, it is made more comprehensible, which is a prerequisite of IL 
development. Second, problematic forms that impede comprehension are highlighted and forced to 
be processed to achieve successful communication. Third, through negotiation, learners receive 
both positive and negative feedback that are juxtaposed immediately to the problematic form, and 
the close proximity facilitates hypothesis-testing and revision (Doughty, 2001). In light of its three-
fold effects on acquisition, the interaction component of Gass’s model really should be regarded as 
a facilitator of learning, not a mechanism for learning.
As a midpoint summary, the models reviewed so far, proposed by Chaudron (1985), 
Sharwood Smith (1986), and Gass (1997), converge on the necessity of comprehensible input (or 
comprehended input, in Gass’s term). Learners must be able to decode enough of the input to 
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formulate a conceptual representation, through which linguistic structures can be called upon from 
current competence and be compared with the external and apperceived structure. Paradoxically, 
but perhaps not incompatibly, there must also be incomprehensible input—some extra bits of 
linguistic forms that cause a mental jolt in processing. Had everything in the input been completely 
understood, learners would generally feel no need to attend to forms, and acquisition of missing 
structures would not occur. In other words, because of the incomprehensibility of the input, 
learners’ attention is drawn to the specific structure. Then cognitive comparison between IL 
representation and external representation would take place, which would eventually lead to 
acquisition (Gass, 1997; VanPatten, 1990; White, 1987). Gass’s interaction model aims to create 
exactly such moments, as already described above. 
An example of this interplay between comprehensible and incomprehensible input is the 
Processing Instruction approach created by VanPatten and his collaborators (Slobin, 1985; 
VanPatten, 1996, 2002; VanPatten & Cadierno, 1993a, 1993b). With this approach, they try to 
induce failure and generate the need for learners to divert from their default processing strategies to 
attend to the specific form that requires acquisition. Although it is not certain at this point whether 
learners’ innate processing strategies themselves can really be altered through this method, it has at 
least included both the comprehensible and incomprehensible input which need to work in tandem 
for the development of IL grammar. For that purpose, the conception of Processing Instruction 
adheres to the key views presented in the above models, and its instructional results have generally 
been successful (e.g., Benati, 2005; Cheng, 2004; Morgan-Short & Bowden, 2006; VanPatten & 
Cadierno, 1993). As can be seen, the thoughts on comprehensible and incomprehensible input in 
fact converge.
The last model reviewed here is Carroll’s (1999, 2000) Autonomous Induction Theory. It 
provides a contrast to the above views on the primacy of comprehension and attention. Carroll’s 
model is adapted from Jackendoff’s (1987) modularity model and Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett, and 
Thagard’s (1986) induction model. Basically, linguistic faculty is comprised of a chain of 
representations, with the lowest level interacting with physical stimuli, and the highest with 
conceptual representations (cf. Carroll, 1999). Two types of processors are at work for each level 
of representation: the integrative processor combines smaller representations into larger units, and 
the correspondence processor is responsible for moving the representations from one level to the 
next (e.g., from the acoustic level to the phonological level). Together, the two processors form an 
encapsulated and sequential module. At each tier of the encapsulated modules, the representations 
are categorized and combined according to UG-based or long-term memory-based rules. This 
procedure outlines how input is processed for parsing.
Carroll (1999, 2000) makes a clear distinction between processing for parsing and for 
acquisition. It is exactly when the parsers fail that the acquisitional mechanisms are triggered—a 
view that is somewhat aligned with the notion of incomprehensible input. But instead of using a 
very general notion of noticing the gap and cognitive comparison, Carroll spells out the sequence 
of restructuring and enhances the understanding on this somewhat vague area. Namely, during 
successful parsing, rules are activated in each processor to categorize and combine representations. 
Failures occur when the rules are inadequate or missing. Consequently, the rule that comes closest 
to successfully parse the specific unit would be selected and would undergo the most economical 
and incremental revision. This process is repeated until parsing succeeds or is at least passable at 
that given level. This procedure explains the process of acquisition, where the exact trigger for 
acquisition is parsing failure resulting from incomprehensible input.
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Continuing with the discussion of comprehensible and incomprehensible input, Carroll 
(2000) contradicts the way Gass (1997) conceptualizes and sequences input-processing in her 
model. Gass conceives of intake as a subset of comprehended input. However, according to 
Carroll’s logic, comprehension involves the extraction of meaning to form conceptual 
representations, and conceptual representations are, by nature, open to introspection. According to 
Jackendoff (1987), they are the format in which we think. If the stage of intake follows 
comprehended input (which is comprised of these conceptual representations), it may imply that 
intake and any further mental comparisons are also open to introspection. Carroll argues that this 
scenario might be flawed: the theoretical concept of the black-box LAD does not include conscious 
introspection.  Empirical support has not yet been provided for learners being able to utilize 
conscious comparison during online processing (Jackendoff, 1987). Upon closer examination, 
though, Carroll’s contradiction against Gass’ model may simply be an artifact of the researcher’s 
definition of intake —with Caroll’s model defining intake as a subset of physical stimuli and 
Gass’s model defining intake as a set of processed structures waiting to be incorporated into IL 
grammar. Nevertheless, Carroll’s argument raises a point that had not been explicitly pointed out 
in the previous models: The stage of cognitive comparison (whether it takes place in LAD or at 
each parsing processor) remains largely automatic and evasive to conscious reflection. At best, the 
awareness comes only after the fact. This insight is echoed in all the models reviewed.
Thus far, the discussion above has disambiguated the terminological difference of intake 
and found consensus in the view of comprehensible/incomprehensible input. Also, the unconscious 
nature of mental comparison is brought to the fore. However, there still remains the issue of 
noticing and attention. In the models reviewed, noticing and attention have appeared in several 
places. First, noticing the gap and making cognitive comparisons are viewed by all models as the 
key to restructuring (Schmidt & Frota, 1986). As mentioned earlier, regardless of the proposed 
location of such operation, this process has thus far been regarded as automatic and is not open to 
introspection. As Jackendoff (1987) argued, learners can at best attend and become aware of the 
resulting representations, but not the actual processes that bring about that representation. The 
second juncture where noticing and attention have also been discussed is at the preliminary, 
perceptual stage. Chaudron (1985), Sharwood Smith (1986), and Gass (1997) considered attention 
as a required element to convert external stimuli into some representations inside of the learners. 
But Carroll (1999, 2000) asserted that attention should not be used as a blanket term, and an 
adequate model of input processing needs to take into account the interaction between learners’ 
current knowledge and attention. In her conception, attention is evoked after the input has been 
preliminarily processed at the base processor; it is a result of processing, not a prerequisite. Yet 
within Carroll’s (2000) processors, there also exists internally “a selection function that restricts 
the number of structures under analysis” (p. 126). It has not been specified by Carroll what 
mechanisms enable this selection function. Synthesizing all the above views, Chaudron, Sharwood 
Smith, and Gass’ stance on attention is not actually incompatible with Carroll’s. One possible 
explanation for this apparent disagreement is that it is an artifact of the way each researcher 
conceived input processing: Each researcher created his/her model based on a different starting 
point of processing. More importantly, the diverging views actually highlighted the importance of 
attention, and it may be so prevalent that it operates before the initial processor, within the 
processor, and as a result of processing, as suggested by the various models. The importance of 
attention has already been researched with great interest, as seen in Schmidt’s (1990) Noticing 
Hypothesis and the substantial body of related studies (e.g., Carr & Curran, 1994; Nissen & 
Bullemer, 1987; Schmidt, 1990, 2001; Tomlin & Villa, 1991; among others). The way attention 
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and input interact has been the central discussion point in so much of the instructional-related 
research, such as input enhancement, recasts, and processing instruction. From the above four 
processing models, one can at least conclude that attention (or even awareness) remains a 
mediating factor in input processing. The appeal of attention in SLA research is that it seems to be 
more responsive to manipulation and enhancement, whereas the other mechanisms in the 
acquisitional process (such as the LAD) largely remain beyond conscious control.
CONCLUSION
The discussion of the four models above aimed to explore how input is processed and 
incorporated in SLA. It also demonstrated that the seemingly common terminologies (input vs. 
intake; comprehensible vs. incomprehensible input) in the models have been conceived by 
different researchers to encapsulate different components and highlight various aspects of the 
process as a whole. It has also been found that all four models agree that cognitive/structural 
comparison is the key to development, regardless of the specific location of operation, though it 
remains largely beyond conscious control or instructional manipulation. Alternatively, attention 
may come in as a mediating factor at the perceptual level. There is a substantial body of research 
available now regarding the actual effect of attention (e.g., Carr & Curran, 1994; Nissen & 
Bullemer, 1987; Schmidt, 1990, 2001; Tomlin & Villa, 1991). An investigation on the interaction 
of attention, input, and learners’ knowledge may prove to be fruitful, especially for instructed SLA. 
In addition, in recent decades, more cognitive and neurological research paradigms have been 
brought into the field as a different lens to examine the process of SLA (e.g., Baddeley, 2003; 
Gathercole, Service, Hitch, Adams, & Martin, 1999). The studies on working memory and 
procedural and declarative knowledge may provide additional evidence and perspectives and may 
perhaps augment the models reviewed above to produce a more comprehensive picture of the 
process of SLA. 
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